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Abstract—Wireless body area network(WBAN) has shown
great potential in improving healthcare quality not only for
patients but also for medical staff. However, security and privacy
are still an important issue in WBANs especially in multi-
hop architectures. In this paper, we propose and present the
design and the evaluation of a secure lightweight and energy
efficient authentication scheme BANZKP based on an efficient
cryptographic protocol, Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) and a
commitment scheme. ZKP is used to confirm the identify of the
sensor nodes, with small computational requirement, which is
favorable for body sensors given their limited resources, while the
commitment scheme is used to deal with replay attacks and hence
the injection attacks by committing a message and revealing
the key later. Our scheme reduces the memory requirement by
56.13 % compared to TinyZKP [13], the comparable alternative
so far for Body Area Networks, and uses 10 % less energy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless body area network is a promising technology for
various applications, and it shall be increasingly necessary
for monitoring, diagnosing and treating populations. Recent
medical reports predict that the number of people using home
health technologies will reach the 78 million consumers by
2020 instead of 14.3 million consumers in 2014. Body sensors
shipments will hit 3.1 million units every year. To address
the increasing use of sensors in this area, a new technology
called WBAN (Wireless Body Area Networks) has emerged
in response to the various disadvantages associated with wired
sensors commonly used to monitor patients in hospitals and
emergency rooms. The mess of wires attached to a patient is
not only uncomfortable for patients, leading to a very limited
mobility and making patients anxious, but it is also difficult
to manage for staff. Voluntary disconnections of sensors by
patients are very common and reintegrating these sensors
properly is difficult if not impossible.
WBANs could hence represent a true advance in digital
patient care. However, their characteristics such as the use
of a wireless medium with a low SNR, or the multi-hop
communication, expose information to multiple types of se-
curity and privacy attacks (e.g., eavesdropping, modification,
loss, injection), and make these attacks even more likely
than in traditional wireless sensor networks. Two classical
bricks are classically used to prevent such attacks: nodes
authentication and communication encryption. However, their
implementation in WBANs is a real challenge.
Existing security mechanisms, such as asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, used in wireless networks are inappropriate given the
body sensors limitations in terms of power, memory capacity,
communication and computational capabilities.
To establish a trust relationship among the WBAN sensors,
and to ensure a secure forwarding of collected data from
the different nodes of the network to a collection point, an
lightweight authentication mechanism must be implemented.
The primary focus of TinySec [5], a popular secure link-
layer protocol, is to ensure a secure communication between
sensor nodes. Its designed to be easy to use, to consume
little energy and to require a minimal amount of memory.
Unfortunately, there is no restriction on keying method, and a
single key pair is selected for the whole network which allow
an adversary to pollute an entire network by compromising
only one single node [22].
To deal with this problem, Luk et al. proposed an efficient
solution in MiniSec [12], in which each pair of nodes shares
two secret keys, one for each direction of communication. An
internal counter for each direction is used as a nonce and
incremented at each use of the associated key. The counters
must be synchronized on both sides and only the last bits are
included in the packet to minimise the transmission energy.
The drawback is that every node should keep a counter for
each of its neighbours, which are possible senders, resulting
in high memory overhead and making the resynchronization
of counters a very expensive operation, since the counter can
be unsynchronized.
The basic idea behind µTesla [15] is to solve some difficul-
ties of standard Tesla in sensor networks to achieving asym-
metric cryptography via delayed disclosure of the symmetric
keys. A sender signs messages using the commitment scheme
and broadcast the message without disclosing the key. A short
time later, the sender broadcasts the key that will not be used
in the future. Time synchronization is necessary between the
involved nodes [21], which increases authentication delay [13].
Even if the commitment scheme used in µTesla requires
approximately 1000 times less computational resources than
ECDSA [4]; the number of packet that should be stored in
each node until the disclosure of the keys may require large
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memory, since the key disclosure is independent from the
packets broadcast, and is tied to time intervals.
The TinyPK scheme described in [19] based on the use
of the public key cryptography using RSA with a public
exponent equal to 3, and different Diffie Hellman key ex-
changes to ensure the authenticity of the sink. However, this
process increases authentication delay and the evaluation of
the scheme shows that the nodes spend much time realizing
public and private key operations. In addition, Das et al. found
a vulnerability against masquerade attack of TinyPK in [1].
Compared to the RSA crytpo-system, systems based on elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) described in [20],
are more efficient since they are capable to maintain the same
security level with shorter key sizes. However the transmission
and verification of public key certificates require an additional
power consumption and memory.
Li et al. proposed a secure sensor association and key
management scheme for WBAN, called group device pairing
(GDP) [9], by using an out of band authentication technique.
They assume the existence of auxiliary channels and require
the users to visually inspect simultaneous LED blinking pat-
terns in order to achieve a good level of authentication. Such
human aided verification may not be intuitive to use, and it is
unlikely to be appropriate for emergency scenario [16].
A distributed prediction based secure and reliable renting
framework (PSR) was proposed in [11] for wireless body area
networks. Each node maintains a matrix, in which it stores the
link quality measurements between itself and all other nodes
in the network during the last p past time slots. They also
proposed an authentication scheme that requires computational
resources and hence an additional energy consumption.
To cope with these constraints Goldwasser et al. [3] de-
veloped an efficient cryptographic protocol (Zero Knowledge
Proof) with small computational requirement and less energy
consumption. ZKP can be used in both exchange keys, and
authentication mechanisms.
To our best knowledge, the first to use Zero Knowledge
Protocol in WBAN was [13]. This scheme, called TinyZKP,
allows a receiver R to verify that a piece of data originates
from a sender S without leaking any secret information. The
results in [13] demonstrate that the performance of TinyZKP
is better compared to other existing approaches (i,e. T-ECDSA,
W-ECDSA), in terms of execution time, memory requirement
and energy consumption. However TinyZKP used a large pre-
distributed set of keys, 20 private keys, and 20 public keys for
each node. It requires memory in the nodes and complicates
the registration phase. The service provider has to register the
public keys of every sensor node (e.g. 120 public keys for 6
nodes) into to the base station (sink). Furthermore to sign a
message TinyZKP used ECDSA algorithm [4] in which the
shortest possible signature size is 320 bits, which requires
computational resources.
Our contribution: In this paper, we present and prove
correctness of BANZKP, a novel ZKP-based solution. It allows
two entities to verify their mutual identities with the low
computational requirement of a local Zero Knowledge Proof
scheme. Zero Knowledge Proof schemes, when used alone, are
vulnerable to replay attack [3], which can permit an adversary
to inject false data once he successfully performed a replay
attack. To cope with this problem, BANZKP uses another
cryptographic tool: a Commitment Scheme that allows one
party to commit the message and reveal the secret later. The
security and efficiency performance of our scheme are evalu-
ated in the OMNET++ simulator, by implementing BANZKP
as an add-on to the convergecast routing protocol. Compared
to TinyZKP [13], BANZKP reduces the memory requirement
by 56,13% and the energy by 10%.
Section II discuss several security and privacy issues
for WBAN. In Section III we describe our authentification
scheme. In Section IV we analyse its privacy, security and
efficiency and compare it to TinyZKP.
II. TOOLBOX
The main goal of our work is to ensure a trust relationship
among the WBAN nodes, and ensure a secure and privacy-
protecting forwarding process of the medical data collected
by the sensor nodes to the sink. This solution shall take into
account the nodes constraints in terms of energy and computa-
tion. The secure term can indeed cover many security features,
such as data confidentiality, authentication, data integrity,
data freshness, secure management, availability, dependability
revocability, accountability, or non-repudiation [8], [7], [17].
In BANZKP, we focus on the three main properties: data
confidentiality, data authenticity, and data integrity, as most
other properties derive from these ones.
Concerning privacy, Li et al. [10] outlined a good and
explicit taxonomy of privacy in traditional WSN (that can
be heavily borrowed in WBAN), by dividing it into two
principal axes: Data-oriented privacy and Context-oriented
privacy. Data-oriented privacy concerns the data created or
transmitted within the network, while context-oriented pri-
vacy cover contextual information such as the location of a
node/network, or the timing of traffic flows. In BANZKP, we
first focus on data privacy by ensuring that in the case of
multihop communication, only the emitter and the sink are
able to have access to the unencrypted patient-related data.
To this extent, BANZKP combines two cryptographic tools:
a Zero Knowledge Proof scheme and a Commitment scheme
that are described hereafter.
Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP): The main objective of
ZKP schemes is to let two parties, a sender and a veri-
fier, verify the identity of their peer. Both nodes exchange
a few challenge/response messages without disclosing any
information about a shared secret to the other party and
henceforth to any eavesdropper. [14] proved that ZKP schemes
have the following 4 main properties: a) the verifier cannot
guess any information from the exchanged messages during
the challenge/response phase; b) the sender cannot cheat the
verifier; c) the verifier cannot cheat the sender; d) the verifier
cannot cheat another party by pretending to be the sender.
Comitment Scheme: Commitment schemes [9], are cryp-
tographic primitives used to prevent eavesdropping by letting
a sender transmit an encrypted message to a receiver which
does not possess the decryption key yet. The key shall be
transmitted later, when the sender receives a signal from the
receiver. If used with classical additional techniques, it has the
following properties. a) a receiver cannot cheat and replay the
message or use it to make its own calculation; b) the sender
cannot cheat by changing the message after committing it.
III. BANZKP AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
BANZKP uses symmetric cryptography to provide data
confidentiality, as asymmetric key cryptography requires a
high computationally and energy resources, which is not fa-
vorable for resources limitation of body sensor nodes. Besides,
BANZKP uses the challenge-response mechanism of a ZKP
protocol as well as a Commitment Scheme to let the sensors
authenticate the sink node.
BANZKP supposes that a relaying protocol provides and
updates valid routes between each node and the data sink. For
evaluation, we used the convergecast routing protocol provided
by Omnet++, which works in two simple and generic phases.
First, to establish the routes the sink broadcasts a Route-Flood
message to every node in the network. This message is used
by each node to choose a parent towards the sink and build
a collection tree. The metric to compare routes can be any
additive metric and nodes only maintain a single path towards
the sink that will be used in the data transmission phase. Nodes
do not know each other and cannot communicate together
directly.
TABLE I: Main notations
Notation Description
IDi The node ID of sensor node i
Kx,y The symmetric session key between x and y
KCS The commitment scheme key
V0,n The secret information shared between the sink (node
0) and n
pn,0 The random value chooses by n
q0,n The random value chooses by the node 0
E(K[M]) Encryption message M with the session key K
RI Random interval
L(X) Length of X
|| Concatenation operator
A. System Parameters and Assumptions
We consider a network composed by 7 nodes, numbered
from 0 to 6, deployed around, on, or implanted into the human
body. BANZKP makes the following assumptions, which are
the same as TinyZKP:
1) The nodes and the sink are assumed to be protected
from physical compromission and trustworthy. This as-
sumption is reasonable because the different nodes and
the sink are handled by a patient and can be protected
in secure location. Besides, the nodes can be equipped
with anti-tampering mechanisms. Therefore we can limit
protection to external attacks only.
2) Due to the constrained resources of the body sensor
nodes, computationally expensive and energy intensive
operations shall be avoided to calculate and transmit
keys. Therefore, the different keys and parameters used
by BANZKP should be uploaded by an operator in the
nodes before deployment.
3) To register a new node as a member of a given WBAN
network, or to replace a node that does not work
anymore, the sink must be accessible by the operator
in order to register the new node, i.e. to upload in the
sink shared parameters specific to this node. The use of
close-range pairing mechanisms could be used at this
stage.
Under the previous assumptions, for each node n, BANZKP
uses and maintains the following values:
1) n shares with the sink (node 0) a session key K0,n,
n={1, ..., 6}. The values of K0,n are different for each
node, uploaded manually at the node registration phase
and should kept secret.
2) n shares with a sink a number V0,n, n={1, ..., 6} used
for authentication. The values of V0,n are different for
each node, , uploaded manually at the node registration
phase and should kept secret.
3) n chooses a random number pn,0, n={1, ..., 6} used for
authentication with the sink node.
4) The sink chooses randomly one different random num-
ber for each node n : q0,n, n={1, ..., 6}.
B. BANZKP protocol
BANZKP is composed of two phases: a registration phase
in which an operator physically pairs the nodes and the sink
and an online authentification phase, both described below.
Registration Phase: In this phase, an operator (aka ser-
vice provider) registers each node with the sink by uploading
each secret number {V0,1, V0,2,..., V0,6} into the sink which is
considered as the authentication center, as well as the different
shared keys, {K0,1, K0,2,..., K0,6}. These keys, shared by the
sink and each node, allow sensors to communicate with the
sink and ensure a secure data forwarding.
Authentication Phase: We suppose that the sensors
are deployed at designated places (on/in/around the human
body), and that system initialization is finished. When a node
N has data to send, it starts the authentication mechanism.
Authentication is mutual, which means that the node shall
prove its identity to the sink and verify that the sink is the
expected one. Our approach is based on the strength of the zero
knowledge proof algorithm, and the communication between
the sensor node N and the sink 0 can be decomposed in the
five following steps:
1) Sensor node → sink: E
(
K0,N
[
IDN ||V pN,00,N
])
The node N draws pN,0, calculates V
pN,0
0,N , concatenates
it to its identifier IDN , encrypts it with its session key
K0,N and sends the entire resulting message to the the
sink.
2) sink → sensor node:
E
(
K0,N
[
ID0||V q0,N0,N ||RI
])
, E
(
KCS
[(
V
pN,0
0,N
)q0,N ])
Upon receiption of the initial message, the sink decrypts
it and then proceeds its calculations; it firstly calculates
V
q0,N
0,N and encrypts it with the session key K0,N , and
then calculates (V pN,00,N )
q0,N , which has minimum size
of 1096 bits, chooses a random interval such as the size
of this latter must be 200 bits, and encrypts it with the
commitment scheme key KCS (chosen randomly). The
beginning of the interval RI is encrypted with the session
key K0,N .
The encrypted message, which includes the identifier,
ID0, V
qN,0
0,N , RI and (V
pN,0
0,N )
q0,N interval value, is sent
to the sensor node N.
3) Sensor node → sink: E
(
K0,N
[
IDN ||
(
V
q0,N
0,N
)pN,0])
When it receives the message from the sink, the sensor
node N stores the received commitment message as it
is, decrypts the other part of the message and calculates
(V
q0,N
0,N )
pN,0 from the received value V q0,N0,N , and then ex-
tracts the beginning of the interval RI from the received
message to send the same size of interval (starting from
RI) from the calculated value, by then concatenates IDN
and (V q0,N0,N )
pN,0 , encrypts it with the shared session key
and sends the message to the sink.
4) sink → sensor node: KCS
In this step, the sink verifies the authenticity of the node
as follows: if the interval of bits received in the message
after decrypting is equal to the interval calculated by
the sink in step 2, which means that (V pN,00,N )
q0,N =
(V q0,N0,N )
pN,0 , then the sink sends the key KCS used to
commit the 200 bits in the second step to the node N.
Otherwise, the sink stops the authentication mechanism
and rejects all the data coming from this sensor node,
until it succeeds its authentication.
5) Sensor node → sink: E(K0,N [IDN ||DATA])
If the authentication of the node N is successfully
done in step 4, the node receives the key commitment
scheme KCS from the sink, which will enable it to
decrypt the interval value of (V pN,00,N )
q0,N , and checks the
authenticity of the sink. The node N encrypts thereafter
the DATA and the IDN and sends the message to the
sink.
Otherwise the node N denies the sink S and sends no
data.
IV. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the performance of our solution
in term of security, communication and computational cost
efficiency. As mentioned previously an adversary may initi-
ate only external attacks by using computationally powerful
devices such as personal computers. For example he/she can
eavesdrop all the traffic between the different nodes and the
sink, inject arbitrary messages, replay old ones, and spoof node
identities. It is also necessary to mention that an external
adversary can launch denial of service (DoS) attacks, such
as the black-hole attack, in which the attacker discards all
received data, (these security attacks type is out from the scope
of this paper). We make no assumption about the number of
adversaries or their localizations.
A. Security and Privacy Analysis
We present in the following, the attacks that can be coun-
tered by our solution.
a) Forge node: In this attack the attacker acts as a
legitimate node which can result an additional consumption
of energy, not only of the sink but of the entire network since
the used communication is a multi-hop broadcast, leading after
that an attacker to inject false data. In our solution, before
sending the data, the node must be authenticated to the sink.
If the challenge imposed by the sink is not successfully done
by the node, the sink will ignore all data coming from the
node.
b) Forge sink: In this attack, the attacker acts as a
legitimate sink to collect the pertinent data coming from
different nodes. As our authentication scheme is mutual, the
node, must be sure of the identity of the sink before sending
any data. In addition, the data sent by the nodes are encoded
with a key shared only between the legitimate sink and the
relevant node.
c) Replay attack: In this attack, the attacker tries to
maliciously or fraudulently replay the (V pN,00,N )
q0,N interval
values to make the sink think that it is one of the legitimate
nodes in order to gain admission to the network, which can
easily overrule the authentication mechanism. To prevent this
attack we use the principle of commitment scheme that allows
the sink to commit a message and reveal it later, which allows
us to avoid this attack and also prevent the data injection
attack that may result by making a successfully replay the
(V
pN,0
0,N )
q0,N interval values.
d) Injection attack: As previously mentioned, this attack
can be introduced after passing the replay attack. In this attack
the attacker will try to inject false data into the network. The
main goal of this attack can be to circulate false information, to
consume the resources of a node, or just saturate (overload)
the network, it can also cause a bad decision that can have
catastrophic consequences, especially when it comes to life or
death of a human being.
e) Man in the Middle Attack: In this attack the main goal
of the attacker is to get in between the legitimate node and
the sink to control the entire conversation by establishing an
independent connection with both of them, in order to sniff and
intercept messages and by then trying to recover the secret or
to gain access to sensitive information and perform malicious
activities, or simply to get the pertinent data sent to the sink.
However, in our solution, no information about the secret is
disclosed, also the data sent to the sink are encrypted and
no information on the key is sent over the communication
channel.
f) Guessing Attack: In this attack the attacker tries to
guess the key or the secret information by collecting several
messages exchanged between the different nodes and the sink.
Our proposed authentication protocol is effectively resisting
to this attack since there is no secret information transmitted
in BANZKP scheme. Even if in our scheme the Commitment
Scheme key (KCS) is sent in plain text, this latter gets changed
with every communication and only 200 random interval is
sent, thereby rendering the task of guessing shared values very
difficult. Moreover, the nodes also generates a random values
(p and q) with every communication. Consequently the values
also change randomly.
g) Attack on privacy: Privacy preservation of sensitive
data in Body Area Networks is particularly a difficult chal-
lenge. One of the most common and easiest form of attack
on data privacy is eavesdropping and passive monitoring.
If the messages are not protected the attacker can easily
understand and guess the disease that the patient suffer from.
In our solution the messages are protected by cryptographic
mechanism.
B. Efficiency Analysis
In this subsection we compare the communication and
computational requirement of our protocol with respect to
TinyZKP [13].
Communication cost Analysis: The communication cost
of our authentication scheme can be achieved by four messages
exchange and evaluated as follows:
2 ∗ L(V p/q) + 2 ∗ L((V q0,n0,n )pn,0) + L(KCS) = 1000 bits.
TinyZKP communication cost is at least: L(Mchall) +
L(ECDSA(Mchall)) + L(SHA− 1(Xm)) + L(Ym) = 1710
bits.
Computational cost Analysis: Since in our solution the
different keys are pre-distributed, the computational cost (in
term of keys generation) is hence equal to zero. According
to the literature [2], the average number of modular multipli-
cations for generating or verifying the identity is T*(k+2)/2,
where T is the number of times we recalculate the modular
multiplication, and k is the number of times we calculate a
modular multiplication. In TinyZKP the authors use the mod-
ular multiplications to calculate the public keys. Therefore, the
computational cost is 1*(20+2)/2=11, which requires not only
additional computational resources but also a large memory in
each node, especially for the sink node, that should hold the
different public keys of each node (i.e. 120 public key for a 6
node network).
V. SIMULATION SETTINGS AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS
A. Simulation settings
In this section, we evaluate our authentication and com-
munication sending scheme by implementing it as an add-
on to the convergecast routing protocol through the MiXiM
project [6], that joins and extends several existing simulation
frameworks developed for wireless and mobile simulations in
Omnet++ [18].
Our WBAN uses a ZigBee technology and consists of 7
sensor nodes deployed in a compact spatial region (in/on or
around a human body). The sensor node that acts as the sink
is the one deployed on the chest. The rest of the sensor nodes
send a challenge/response messages with the sink until the
approval of the identity of each one.
The sensor nodes, on which we have implemented our pro-
posed protocol, have the following characteristics: 2.4 GHZ,
3.3 V Voltage, and the current draw is 10 mAh
The performance of our protocol in terms of energy and
memory consumption are evaluated by simulation and com-
pared to the one achieved by TinyZKP which is to the best
knowledge the only ZKP-based scheme defined for WBAN.
B. Performance results
1) Energy Consumption: As shown in Figure 1. Our
authentication scheme consumes less energy compared to
TinyZKP since in our proposed protocol we used the Com-
mitment Scheme that requires 1000 times less computational
resources than ECDSA [4] and hence induces a lower energy
consumption. Additionally, in TinyZKP, the authors used a
multiplicative modular operation to generate the public keys
which also consumes energy, in contrast of our solution
that uses the a pre-distributed keys. Furthermore, even if
the number of data exchanges in TinyZKP is lower than in
BANZKP, the communication cost has an important impact
in terms of energy consumption and also in this case our
proposed protocol consumes less energy than TinyZKP.
Fig. 1: Energy consume comparaison
2) Memory Consumption: The required memory of the
TinyZKP and BANZKP authentication protocols is given in
Figure2. BANZKP that consumes 56.13 % less memory than
TinyZKP. In TinyZKP a big number of keys must be held
in each node (20 public key and 20 private keys), especially
in the sink node that must hold 120 public keys (in case of
6 nodes), plus 6 session keys for the authentication phase
and 6 other keys for the data transmission. Furthermore
the ECDSA and SHA-1 signature and verifications require
additional memory resources. In contrast, our protocol uses a
Commitment Scheme instead of ECDSA algorithm, and mades
a simple comparison to verify the identity of the second party.
Additionally, the number of keys used in our protocol is much
lower than in TinyZKP.
Fig. 2: Memory Consumption
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we propose and analyze the efficiency of a
new lightweight authentication scheme for WBAN, BANZKP,
which allows two nodes to make sure about the identity of
each other and hence establish a trust relationship among the
WBAN sensors to protect the subsequent wireless multi-hop
communication throughout a low computational and memory
requirement. BANZKP is implemented as an an add-on to the
convergecast routing protocol through the MiXiM project with
the Omnet++ simulator. We then evaluated our protocol in
terms of security and privacy as well as in terms of efficiency.
The analysis shows that our protocol effectively resists to a
variety of security and privacy attacks such as the replay attack
and data injection attack. BANZKP outperforms in terms of
energy and memory cost Tiny ZKP [13] which is, to the best
of our knowledge, the only ZKP scheme defined for WBAN.
Our simulation results show that our authentication scheme
BANZKP requires 56% less memory and 10% less energy
compared to TinyZKP.
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